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Recent U.S. current account deficits represent a net inflow offoreign
saving to help finance our government budget deficits. Budget deficits
have raised domestic real interest rates and the real value ofthe dollar,
causing the deterioration in ourcurrentaccountbalance. Eventually our
real interest rates shouldfall back toward world levels asforeign saving
inflows increase. But, contrary to conventional wisdom, large U.S.
current account deficits will probably remain as long as our budget
deficits persist.
Over the last several years, the United States
economy has seen record highs in federal budget
deficits, real interest rates, the dollar and trade
deficits. Last year, the federal budget deficit climbed
to $195 billion, more than 5 percent ofGNP-the
highest rate of the postwar era. The federal deficit
this year is expected to be about $170 billion. U.S.
real interest rates remain far above past historical
averages, while the dollar recently reached a ten-year
high against the German mark and British pound.
Our current account deficit, measuring the difference
between our imports and exports ofgoods and ser-
vices, will probably reach $90 billion for 1984-
an all-time record. And to finance this deficit, our
nation will have to borrow an unprecedented amount
from abroad.
Many solutions have been proposed to deal with
individual problems arising from these conditions.
Growing fears that trade deficits, and the associated
loss ofjobs and markets for U.S. export industries,
are''de-industrializing" America have added con-
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siderably to protectionist pressures. Improving our
trade deficit was also an objective of the recent
U.S.-Japanese agreementto reduce Japan's barriers
to international capital flows.
Increasingly, though, deficits, high interests rates,
and the dollar are being viewed not as isolated
problems to be dealt with separately, but as closely
related consequencesofa commoncause-govern-
ment fiscal policy. Many analysts believe that fed-
eral budgetdeficits, by pushingup domestic interest
rates, are ultimately responsible for the strong dollar,
itselfthe majorcause ofthe nation's declining inter-
national competitiveness and rising trade deficit.
This view suggests that only by balancing the budget
can the other problems be fundamentally and per-
manently resolved.
Still, there remains considerable controversy over
whether the budget deficits' impacts are really this
pervasive, and over what continued deficits may
mean for the future. Some analysts believe that
increased business investment yields resulting from
recent tax cuts, rather than budget deficits them-
selves, are mainly responsible for our high real
interest rates. Others argue that the high dollar is
more a reflection offoreigners' flight from political
and economic problems in their countries than ofthe attractiveness ofhigh U.S. interest rates. There
is also a very widespread view that our. current
account deficits cannot be sustained much longer,
leading to predictions that the dollar must soon fall
substantially to bring our international trade backto
balance. Yet others argue that ourexternal deficits,
far from being an economic problem, have actually
been beneficial by allowing domestic investment to
remain strong despite the increasingly enormous
credit demands from the government.
These controversies raise the fundamental ques-
tion that is the focus of this paper-what are the
impacts, short-term and long-term, ofbudget defi-
cits in an open economy, one with trade and financial
ties to abroad? In attempting to answer this ques-
tion, ouranalysis begins withthe observation that the
current account deficit is not only the difference
between our exports and imports, it is also the
channel through which foreign saving is brought
into oureconomy to help meet the creditdemandsof
both the government and the private sector. In this
way, a rise in the budget deficit may easily (but not
inevitably) lead to a current account deficit, depen-
ding on the extent to which the government's credit
demands are met, directly or indirectly, from foreign
as well as domestic sources.1
In Section I, we develop a conceptual framework
relating budget deficits, interest rates, exchange
rates, and the currentaccount for an open economy
under flexible exchange rates. This framework sug-
gests that budget deficits are likely initially to raise
domestic real interest rates which, in tum, push up
the real exchange rate. As time passes, this increase
in thereal exchange rate leads to a current account
deficit, allowing foreign saving to supplement do-
mestic saving in financing the budget deficit. In
applying this framework to the U.S. (Section II),
we argue that this sequence fits our experience of
the last several years fairly well, suggesting that
budget policy is indeed mainly responsible for our
current account deficits.
Since ongoing budget deficits imply an ongoing
government need for private saving, ourframework
implies that, in principle, they can lead to ongoing
current account deficits as well. For the U.S., this
suggests that ourcurrent account deficits may indeed
be sustained as long as our budget deficits remain.
Furthermore, these external deficits may help re-
duce, although certainly not eliminate, the economic
costs typically viewed as the consequenceofbudget
deficits. In particular, the inflow of foreign saving
into our economy should allow our interest rates,
and the real value ofthe dollar, to decline somewhat,
and domestic investment to escape substantially, if
not completely, being "crowded out" by the gov-
ernment's credit demands.
I. Conceptual Framework
In this section, we develop a conceptual frame-
work to describe how budget deficits may influence
the current account and the channels through which
this influence is transmitted under a floating
exchange rate regime. Ourtheory applies the modem
asset market approach to exchange rate determina-
tion (forexample, Dornbusch, 1976, Isard, 1980) to
the static short-term fiscal analysis ofMundell (1962)
and Flemming (1962). Our framework integrates
and extends recent work on short-term dynamic
adjustment of the open economy to fiscal deficits
(for example, Blanchard and Dornbusch, 1984,
Hodrick 1980, Sachs and Wyplosz 1984) with an
analysis ofthe deficits' long-term impacts. The next
section then applies this framework to recent U.S.
history. Our analysis is deliberately heuristic and
fairly non-technical. More formal and technical
analysis is relegated to footnotes and cited references.
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A. The Accounting Relation
The basic reason that budget and current account
deficits are related is because budget deficits repre-
sent a use of saving and current account deficits a










The government budget deficit (expenditures less
taxes, G T) must equal, or be financed by, the
excess of private domestic saving (S) over privateinvestment (I) plus the current account deficit. The
current account deficit is the difference between a
nation's expenditures on foreign goods and services
(imports, M) and net transfers (R) and foreign ex-
penditures on our products (exports, X). This dif-
ference must be financed by borrowing an equal
amount of funds from abroad, and in this sense a
current account deficit represents a net tlow offor-
eign funds (foreign saving) to oureconomy.
In tlow of funds terminology, the budget deficit
and private investment constitute competing "uses"
ofsavings. The''sources" ofthis saving are private
domestic saving (S) and the funds from the foreign
sector represented by the current account deficit.
It is not only true that a current account deficit
requires a net intlow offoreign funds to finance it: a
nation can sustain a net financial inflow from abroad
only by incurring an equal current account deficit.
Net borrowing from abroad effectively amounts to
selling foreigners more "IODs" than we purchase
from them. Overall, a nation's accounts with
abroad-trade and financial-must balance. A
country cannot be a net borrower of foreign funds
(net "exporter" of IODs) without being a net im-
porter ofcommodities and services. Thus, a nation
can draw on foreign savings for its domestic needs
only by incurring a current account deficit.
Taken by itself, an increase in government credit
needs might be met partly by borrowing from
abroad. This would seem to suggest that budget
deficits would inevitably lead to current account
deficits. However, the policies orotherfactors lead-
ing to a budget deficit will often affect domestic
savings and investment as well. During a recession,
for example, although the budget deficit tends to
rise, the private domestic saving surplus typically
increases even more (because ofdepressed invest-
ment demand). As a result, the budget and current
account deficits generally move in opposite direc-
tions overthe business cycle. Furthermore, govern-
ment policies underlying a fiscal deficit could have
an independent impact on private saving and invest-
ment that would make it unnecessary to borrow
from abroad. Thus, while there is an important
relation between budget and external accounts, there
is no rigid mechanical linkage between the two.
This means thata budgetdeficit's impact on domes-
tic saving and investment demand must be assessed
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before its implications for the current account can
be determined.
B. Short-run linkages
The purpose of this section is to trace out the
likely short-term effects ofa rise in the government
budget deficit on interest rates, exchange rates, the
domestic saving surplus and the current account.'
To this end, we begin by sketching a simple outline
of the dynamic process. We fill in the details and
modify the story in the following section.
Consider the case where the government adopts
policies that raise the budget deficit but do not
directly affect private sector saving, investment or
the current account. Initially, a rise in the budget
deficit is likely to have expansionary effects on
domestic output and employment. An expanding
economy, in turn, generates an increased private
domestic savings surplus which, to a large extent,
may absorb the additional government demand for
credit without putting significant upward pressure
on real interest rates. As the standard textbook
analysis suggests, interest rate pressures are more
likely to be averted the larger the degree of unem-
ployed resources in the economy and the stronger
the stimulative impact the budget deficits have on
output.
Once the economy approaches full employment
and the initial output effects ofa rise in the budget
deficit subsides, the remaining deficit must be fi-
nanced from a combination of a rise in the private
domestic saving surplus relative to GNP and from
an inflow offoreign saving. Further increases in the
private domestic saving surplus are unlikely to be
forthcoming, however, without arise in real interest
rates.4 In this instance, credit market pressures aris-
ing from the tender of government securities exert
downward pressure on bond prices, and real interest
rates rise as a consequence. Higher real interest
rates, in turn, tend to stimulate private savings
(lower interest-sensitive consumption expenditures)
and slow investment outlays. Through this adjust-
ment process, budgetdeficits may at first be financed
largely from domestic sources.
This is illustrated in Figure I, which shows the
sources and uses of loanable funds in the domestic
economy. The uses of funds represent government
and private domestic demands for credit. The sourcesFigure 1
Sourcesand UsesofLoanable Funds:
EffectsofaRise in Government Credit Demands









Sources of Funds (S)
Uses of Funds (U)
offunds (S) represent domestic private saving plus
foreign saving flowing into the economy for agiven
current account deficit. That is, S represents a
short-run sources-of-funds schedule. The economy
is initially at equilibrium point a, with short-term
real interest rate rl and the uses and sources offunds
equal at Fl. The increase in the budget deficit shifts
out UO to U
I as the government's demand for funds
rises. At unchanged short-term real interest rates,
the total demand for funds, represented by point a',
exceeds the available supply. Excess demand for
funds under normal conditions will increase the real
interest rate from ro to rl , moving the economy
upward along SO as private savings increase, and
away from point a' to point b as private credit
demands are scaled back.
In an open economy, however, increased foreign
savings are also likely to partly finance increased
domestic budget deficits. Higher domestic real in-
terest rates, ceteriusparibus, will cause investors to
attempt to shiftoutofforeign assets and into domes-
tic assets in order to take advantage of higher do-
mestic real yields. The rise in demand for domestic
assets, in tum, will put upward pressure on the
domestic currency in the foreign exchange market.
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As investors move to sell foreign currency for do-
mesticcurrency and use the receipts to purchase
higher yielding domestic bonds, they bid up the
exchange rate.
Real domestic currency.appreciation associated
with higher real interest rates also represents a rise
in the price ofdomestically produced goods relative
to those produced abroad. This weakens export
demand and spurs imports, causing the current ac-
count balance to deteriorate gradually. Current ac-
count deterioration, in tum, is the mechanism that
allows foreign savings to begin to supplement do-
mestic savings in financing domestic government
budget deficits and private domestic investment. In
our diagram, this shifts the short-run sources of
funds schedule from SO to SI and further to S2. The
inflow offoreign savings, which gradually develops
as the current account declines, represents an in-
crease in the net supply of domestic assets held by
foreign investors.
Thus, although increased foreign demand for
domestic assets may at first result primarily in price
effects (exchange rate appreciation), the supply (net
stock) ofdomestic securities available to foreigners
will also begin to increase as domestic currency
appreciation in real terms causesthe currentaccount
to decline and foreign capital to flow into the do-
mestic economy. However, as the sources offunds
schedule shifts outward following the inflow of
foreign savings, domestic credit market pressures
should ease, allowing real interest rates to fall back
toward the world level. This is shown in the diagram
as the movement from rl to r2, and the economy
moves through a succession ofnew short-term asset
market equilibrium positions represented by points
b, c and d. This suggests that the inflow offoreign
savings will play an increasingly important role in
financing domestic budget deficits in an open econ-
omy.
The preceding describes the general pattern of
initial adjustment in an open economy following a
rise in the government budgetdeficit. However, the
same pattern would also result from a business tax
reduction orotherpolicy that increases the after-tax
return on domestic investment but does not neces-
sarily increase the budget deficit. In those cases,
private domestic investment demand would rise,
leading to real interest and real exchange rate in-
creases similar to those just described. Moreover,when a policy increases boththe after-tax return on
domestic investment and the budget deficit, an ad-
ditional reinforcing and magnifying effecton interest
rates and exchange rates would likely be introduced.
We now consider inmore detail two features ofthis
process: the differentroles playedby long-term and
short-term interest rates and the role played by lags
in the adjustment ofthe current account.
Exchange RatesandInterestRates. The extent to
which the real exchange rate initially appreciates
will depend upon marketexpectations ofthe duration
of government budget deficits and how they in-
fluence short-term and long-term real interest rates.
The relationship between the real exchange rate and
real interest rates may be seen explicitly by con-
sidering the equilibrium condition for international
trade in assets:
r* = r - (q - qC) (I)
where
r, r* = log of one plus the domestic and foreign
real interest rates (yield to maturity), re-
spectively.6
q, qC = log of the spot and expected future real
exchange rate, respectively. (The real ex-
change rate is defined as the nominal ex-
change rate-foreign currency per unit of
domestic currency-deflated by the ratio of
the foreign to domestic price levels.) The
bonds underlying r, r* are ofequal maturity
and also correspond to the time horizon of
the real exchange rate expected in the future.
The left-hand side ofEquation (I) represents the
expected real return (risk adjusted)5 available to
foreign investors for holding a foreign bond, r*.
The return available to foreign investors for holding
domestic bonds has two components: the yield on
the domestic bond, r (denominated in domestic cur-
rency), less the expected future depreciation ofthe
domestic exchange rate. The expected percentage
real depreciationofthe currency, in tum, equals the
difference between the currently observed real spot
exchange rate (in log form) and the spotrateexpected
to prevail at the point the domestic bond matures
and the foreign investorconverts the proceeds from
domestic to foreign currency.
Equalized expected real returns for similarbonds
across countries is the condition for international
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capital market equilibrium. When Equation (I)
holds, this condition is met. The expected real return
available on foreign bonds will then equal the ex-
pected real return on domestic bonds, adjusted for
the expected change in the purchasing powerofthe
currency. Investor arbitrage in international capital
markets will cause this equilibrium condition to
hold almost continuously.
This equilibrium condition should hold for the
full term structure ofreal interest rates. Forexample,
in equilibrium, a 10 percent rate of return· on a
one-year foreign security and a 12 percent rate of
return on a one-yeardomestic security indicatesthat
a 2 percent depreciation ofthe domestic currency is
expected by investors over the course of the year.
On the other hand, 10 percent and 12 percent an-
nualized real yields onfive-yearforeign and domes-
tic securities, respectively, suggest that an average
2 percent rate of currency depreciation per year is
expected by investors over a five-year period, indi-
cating a total expected depreciation to maturity of
approximately 10 percent.
That is important because it suggests that budget
deficit policies that lead to an increase in long-term
interest rates are likely to have significantly larger
impacts on real exchange rates than a policy giving
an equal rise in short-term interest rates. Forexam-
ple, consider a one percentage point rise in the
domestic 5-year real interest rate, with no change in
the foreign real interest rate and no change in the
real exchange rate expected to prevail five years in
the future (qe). This would cause investors to bid up
the real value of the domestic currency (q) by 5
percentage points. The real value of the spot ex-
change rate in this case rises to that point above the
expected future value of the exchange rate where
the expected depreciation ofthe domestic currency
(five percentovera five-year period) justoffsets the
additional return on the domestic security. In com-
parison, one percentage point rise in the domestic
one-year real interest rate (with no change in other
expected future short-term interest rates) would lead
to a one percent appreciation of the domestic ex-
change rate, ceterius paribus, thereby setting up an
expected depreciation ofone percent over the year
and restoring net yields on foreign and domestic
securities to equality.7
Budget deficit policies that are not expected to bereversed in the foreseeable future and that lead to
significant increases in long-term real rates ofinter-
est would, therefore, probably result in a much
greater appreciation of the domestic currency than
deficits that are expected to be temporary and in-
fluence mainly short-term rates. Hence, market ex-
pectations ofthe duration ofbudget deficit policies
in the economy and their influence on the term
structure of interest rates will playa major role in
determining the extent to which the domestic cur-
rency appreciates.8
Current Account Adjustment Lags. The path of
the economy we have sketched is crucially depen-
dent upon sluggish current account adjustment. In
particular, lags in the adjustment of the current
account to a rise in the budget deficit are primarily
responsible for the rise, or "overshooting", ofdo-
mestic real interest rates and the real exchange rate
above their long-term values. That is, given suffi-
cient time, budget deficits may raise the current
account deficit, either directly (as fiscal policies
directly alter export supplies and import demands),
or indirectly through their impact on real interest
rates and the real exchange rate. Typically, though,
these adjustments in exports and imports occuronly
after a considerable lag. In the interim, budgetdefi-
cits must be financed primarily from private domes-
tic surplus saving; domestic real interest rates then
must rise to generate this surplus, driving the real
exchange rate above its long-term value.
This process is usually rather lengthy. For exam-
ple, exports and imports generally take two ormore
years to respond fully to changes in real exchange
rates. 9 However, as the current account gradually
adjusts and foreign savings do begin to supplement
domestic sources in financing the budget deficit,
pressures on domestic real interest rates are apt to
ease. Real interest rates and the real exchange rate
are then likely to begin falling back toward their
long-term values, a process only completed when
the current account has fully adjusted. (See Box I.)
Conversely, "overshooting" of interest rates and
the exchange rate would not occur if the current
account were to adjust immediately. Such immediate
adjustment implies that foreign savings could be




Our analysis suggests that increasing inflows
of foreign funds through the current account will
ultimately ease pressures on domestic real interest
rates and the real exchange rate. Where will this
process end? And what are the long-term economic
consequences of ongoing budget deficits? These
questions raise several issues: the sustainability
of current account deficits, the long-term conse-
quences of ongoing budget deficits for domestic
investment, future output and the economic well-
being of the nation's residents, as well as the ulti-
mate levelofdomestic real interest rates and the real
exchange rate.
In considering these issues, we assume that the
government has instituted policies that lead to a
permanent budget deficit fixed at some constant
fraction of GNP. We also presume that domestic
private saving does not rise enough to finance the
deficit fully (so there is, at least potentially, a per-
manent need for foreign saving inflows). Full em-
ployment is also assumed since we are considering
long-term consequences.
Sustainable? There is a widespread conviction
that a nation's current account cannot sustain a
deficit on an ongoing basis, and ultimately must
come back into balance. This view implies that an
ongoing budget deficit would eventually have to be
financed entirely from the surplus saving (S-I) of
the domestic private sector; domestic investment
(or consumption) ultimately would have to fall to
finance the budget deficit.
This presumption would certainly be valid in a
world in which there was no saving or growth.
Foreign wealth would then be constant, yet each
year foreigners would have to allocate an additional
portion of that wealth to finance another nation's
current account deficit. Since foreigners would
eventually run out of funds to lend, an on-going
current account deficit-indeed, an on-going budget
deficit-would be impossible in a static world
economy.
In a growing world economy, however, foreign
saving (which represents the increase in foreign
wealth) could finance a nation's current account
deficit indefinitely (provided it did not exceed for-
eign saving). In this way, foreigners could lend to a111213
nation year-after"year while.maintaining constant
the share of their wealth devoted tothat purpose
(this .share would, ofcourse, be gre:iter the larger
the current account deficit in relation toforeign
savings). iO .Thus, current•accountdeficit§are not
intrinsically unsustainable in a growing world
economy. II
Willing? The reaLlimit to the sustainabilitypfa
currentaccountdeficit islikely tobethe willingness
of foreigners to lend their savings to the. nation
incurring.it. Lending.to anotherl1ation.(itsgovem-
ment or its citizens) often involves .certain risks~
known as "country risks"~thatmay limit the size
of the current account foreigners are willing to .fi-
nance on an on-going basis.
These country risks are ofthree basic types. The
first, known as "sovereign risk", reflects the pos-
sibility that the govemment of the borrower will
default, that is, repudiate its own and/orits citizens'
foreign debts. The second, "transferrisk", refers to
the possibility that the borrower will be unable to
obtain the foreign exchange needed to repay a for-
eign debt (when the loan is extended in foreign
currency). This is most likely to occur when a
nation uses exchange controls to maintain an over-
valuedexchange rate. Transferrisk hasproven to be
the major country risk incurredin lending to devel-
oping nations. Finally, foreign (as well as domestic)
lenders may also face possible losses from certain
macroeconomic policies ofthe.borrower's govern-
ment. The most serious ofthese risks is from policies
that lead to unanticipated inflation and currency
depreciation and thereby reduce the real value ofthe
funds lent. 12
The degree of country risk critically affects the
interest rate a nation must pay to borrow from abroad,
as well as the amount offunds it can obtain. Where
this risk is present, a country must· compensate
foreign lenders by paying them a real interest rate
(adjusted for expected exchange depreciation~see
Equation 2) above that prevailing abroad. This dif-
ference, the "country risk premium", is analogous
to the. yield premium paid by Baa over Triple-A
domestic bonds.
Furthermore, the amount of funds a nation can
borrow from al:>road on an ongoing basis (the sus-
tainable current account deficit) to help finance a
given budgetdeficit will be smallerthe greateris the
country risk and associated risk premium. Indeed, ifthe risk weregrearenough, a nation could find itself
unable to sustain any current account deficit. An
ongoing budget deficit would then raise domestic
real interest rates permanently above world levels,
toalevelthatreducedprivate investment relative to
private/savingenough to finance the deficit entirely
from domestic sources. Thus, the higher the country
risk, the more closely a budget's long-term impacts
ol1inrerest rates and investment will resemble those
fora closed economy, and the more domestic in-
vestment isultirl1ately constrained by the available
domestic savings (less the budget deficit).
Where there is no country risk, a budget deficit's
long-term impacts on domestic interest rates and
investment are likely to be very different. In that
ca<;e, foreigners would be willing to lend to the
nation on the same terms as they receive at home.
The resulting situation is analogous to that facing
individual regions ofthe U.S. economy. Within the
U.S.,the residence ofa borrower does not by itself
usuallyatfect the terms ofa loan, nor does it gener-
ally affect the willingness of a lender to extend
credit. Hence, an Alaskan firm can borrow on the
same terms as a similar Illinois firm, and neither
Alaskan· nor Illinois savers generally have any
"habitat" preference for investments in their own
states' firms. In effect, all borrowers in a given type
ofactivityregardless of their location face a single
national interest rate. In an international context,
the absence ofcountry risk thus means that a nation
with an ongoing budget deficit will see its domestic
real· interest rates ultimately fall back to world
levels. 13
Furthermore, absence ofcountry risk also implies
that the level ofdomestic investment will be deter-
mined by its profitability relative to investments
abroad, not by the level ofprivate domestic saving
less thebudgetdeficit-as is true for a closed econ-
omy..The on-going current account deficit thus
equalsthe difference between the profitable level of
domestic investment and domestic saving less the
budgetdeficit, and will be financed by foreigners at
w()fldreal interest rates. Again, the level ofsaving
ofAlaskan residents was not a serious constraint on
investment in its oil fields; the oil fields were devel-
oped primarily with funds from non-residents.
In sum, where country risk is small, a budget
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deficit'slong-term impact on domestic investment
willdependmainly upon howthe policies generating
thedeficitaffectthe profitabilityofdomestic invest-
ment. The more these policies enhance the profits
fronrthatinvestillent,thehigherthelevel ofinvest-
mentinthenation,andthelargerits national output
andcurrentaccountdeficits in the long-term. On
this basis, deficits resulting from business tax cuts
could raise a nation's share •ofworld investment.
Deficitsthat raise the demand for products the nation
haliacomparativeiadvantage producing may also
tend to encourage domestic investment by raising
the prices ofthOlie products and hence the profits
available to those producing them. Clearly though,
budget deficits may also be generated by policies
thatreduce the yield to domestic investment and lead
toafall in its level relative to that abroad. When
country risk is absent, therefore, the "content"
rather than the size ofthe budget deficit determines
its long-term impact on investment (and national
output) and hence plays a critical role in determining
the size ofthe ongoing current account deficit.
A similar observation applies to the long-term
impact ofbudget deficits on the real exchangerate.
The real exchange rate is simply the nominal rate
,'deflated" by the ratio ofthe domestic to the foreign
price level. As such, it effectively measures the
value of thenation'li products in terms of those
produced abroad (that is, the relative price of a
"basket" of home-produced goods in terms of a
"baliket" of foreign products). Ultimately, this
value will be determined by commodity demand
and liupply for these products. Accordingly, the
deficit's long-term impact onthe real exchange rate
depends on how the measures underlying it affect
the·demand and supply for home versus foreign
products. A deficit generated by measures that shift
demand toward domestic products (for example by
increasing expenditures on domestically-produced
defense goods) will tend to raise their relative price
in terms offoreign products. But a deficit may also
lead to a long-term real depreciation if it shifts
demand away from home goods, or increases their
supply more than the demand for them. Again, the
policies making up the deficits, rather than the defi-
cits' size, are the determining factors. 14II. Applications to the Recent U.S. Experience
Chart 1
Federal Budget Balance
and the U.S. Current Account
Billions of Dollars
The theory outlined .in the previous section leads
to specific: predictions about the wayb\.ldget deficits
are likely to affect the current account, investment
~uld s<iving, andabout the exchange rate ami interest
rate linkages ••through which··thispr9cess .occurs.
HoW well does the United States experience, par-
ticularly recently, fit t~e theory? And which as-
sumpti9ns unqerlying the longer run preqictions of
the theory seem to best fit the U.S. andits relation-





The Real Dollar Exchange Rate
and the U.S. Current Account
1980-82 ~ 100 Billions of Dollars
tively); current accountdeficits are expected to grow
to new. rec9~ds forecasts range from $80-$120
billion in both years. Budgetdeficits and current
account deficits ofthis magnitude are unprecedented.
During the post-1973 floating exchangeTate per-
iod, there has been a close correlation between the
current account and federal budget balances. Chart
I shows the tight link between the cyclically adjusted
federal budget deficit and the current accountbal-
ance of the following year (to allow for sluggish
current account adjustment) in the 1973-83 period.
These developments are consistent withthe pat-
tern predicted by theory. In addition, the sharp
deterioration in the currentaccount is mostprobably
related to the extraordinarily high value ofthe dollar
in recent years. This inverse correlation is shown in
Chart 2. Numerous formal empirical analyses also
suggest that the more than 40 percent appreciation
of the average value of the dollar since 1980. is
responsible for the greater part of the U.S. curre.nt
account deterioration. 15 The high level ofreal long-
term interest rates (inflation-adjusted) prevailing in
the U.S. since 1980, in tum, may be largely respon-
sible for the dollar's dramatic appreciation. This is
illustrated in Chart 3, and is the conclusion reached
by a numberofformal empirical studies. 16
Moreover, part of the recent pattern of U.S. in-
terest rates is also consistent with the dynamic pro-












The recent\.lpward climb in the federal budget
deficit is in fact associated with a substantial deter-
ioration in the current account of the balance of
payments. The federal budget deficit climbed from
$57.9 billion in 1981 to $1I0.6 billion in 1982, and
further to $195.4billion in 1983. Following a similar
trend, the current account deteriorated over this
period from a $4.5 billion surplus in 1981, to an
$11.2 billion deficit in 1982 and a $40.8 billion
deficit in 1983. In addition, while budget deficits
are expected to level off in 1984 and 1985 (the
CouncilofEconomic Advisors forecasts $183 billion
and $180 billion deficits in 19S4 and 1985, respec-
Source: Fieleke (1984), Chart 2, p. 7. Budget data are from
SurveyofCurrent Business and from Commerce Depart-
mentstatt; currentaccountdataarefrom Economic Report
ofthe President, 1984, p. 250 (net foreign investment) and
Commerce Department staff, except for 1984, which is a
forecast.
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Sources: Current account data-see notes to Chart 1; real
dollar exchange rate data are from Morgan Guaranty Trust
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Sources: Federal budget balance data are from Survey of
Current Business; real interest rate is the difference be-
tweenthe20-year constant maturity bond and the year-
oveFyear percent change in the Personal Consumption
Expenditure Index.
t;liptyinvolving.thefuturecourseofU.S. fiscal and
monetary policies and, hence, the future course of
real interest rates. In the face ofsignificant uncer-
tai~ty,and with ••continual revisions ofexpectations
~~<ne)\linfollllation becomes available, the exact
paths ofreallong-tenn interest rates and the real
exthange<iate<areconsiderably more difficult to
predict than our simple theory suggests. A high
dollarand high real interest rates could continue for
a cO~SideffPleperiod· ~nder these circumstances.
A second factor may be the timing ofthe predict-
.eddecline in real rates and the dollar. Foreign capital
inflows may not yet have reached the point where
they can signifitantlyease pressures on U.S. capital
markets, particUlarly.in light of the rapid rise in
private credit demands associated with the robust
U.S. economic recovery. Ifthis is the case, interest
rates and the dollar could edge downward when the
recovery maturesandprivatecreditdemands abate.
In any case, the budget deficit explanation is at
leastas consistent with the actual record as the main
altern~tives that have been offered. As noted earlier,
sOme have argued that the massive net inflows of
capitalmainly reflect flight into the U.S. as a "safe
haven" from political and economic troubles abroad
rather than a response to high U.S. real interest
rates. But such a flight, while it could explain the
high dollar and (hence) deteriorating current ac-
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levels of short-tenn and long-tenn interest rates
since 1981 may be attributable mainly to large and
increasing federal government budget deficits (see
Chart 4). The rapid runup in long-tenn rates, in
particular, is consistent with market expectations of
a long series of large future budget deficits, and
associated high future short-tenn interest rates. For-
mal statistical evidence on the budget deficit/real
interest rate link is inconclusive,17 however, due
perhaps to the fact that past large budget deficits
have generally (aside from war periods) occurred
during recessions when private credit demand was
weak. In contrast to ourpresent situation, past defi-
cits typically have disappeared once the economy
reached full-employment. Nevertheless, based on
the lack of a strong simple statistical correlation
during-the greater part ofthe post-warperiod, seve-
ral prominentobservershave contendedthat present
budget deficits are not primarily responsible for our
high real interest rates, and therefore deny their
consequences for the dollar and the current account. IR
In contrast to what theory suggests, there is as yet
no indication that credit market conditions in the
U.S. have eased with the large inflow of foreign
capital. Both real interest rates and the real value of
the dollar continue to remain at high levels. Several
factorsmay be responsible for these developments.
Perhaps most important is the great deal of uncer-
1980--82=100
16real interest rates relative to those prevailing abroad.
The safe haven analysis therefore cannot be the
main explanation for the events we havetraced.
Another potential explanation attributes the dol-
lar's strength, and highIJ.S...realinterestrates (on
financial assets), to the increased after-tax yield on
investment in the U.S.that resulted from recent
reductions in corporate taxes. As indicated earlier,
such a fiscalpolicy would raise private investment
demand and leadtoessentially the samepattern of
interest rate.,exchal1ge rate,and current account
adjustments as a. budgetdeficit. This explanation,
however, complements rather than competes with
the budget deficit explanation. Both trace high in-
terest rates and the high dollar to fiscal policy. 19
B. Long-Term Implications
Sincethere is some evidence that the theoryofthe
last section does apply to the present U.S. situation,
it is worthwhile to consider its implications con-
cerning the long-term effects ofour budget deficits
should they persist indefinitely (as most observers
believe they will without substantial policy
changes). In particular, are the large currentaccount
deficits the U.S. has been running really unsustain-
able as many observers believe? If not, how large
could they be on an ongoing basis? And will ongoing
budget deficits inevitably mean high real interest
rates, depressed investment and lower future output?
Large as U.S. currentaccount deficits have been,
they are still substantially less than the foreign sav-
ing available tofinance them. Forexample, adeficit
equal to 2.5 percent ofGNP-slightlyless than the
rate projected for this year-represents about 12
percent of the saving offoreign industrial nations,
net of depreciation. Foreigners certainly could fi-
nance U.S. deficits in this range, although the share
oftheir wealth they ultimately would have to devote
to claims on our country (about 12 percent) would
certainly be very large by historical standards. 20
Morever, any country risk associated with the
U.S. is apt to be very small, indeed negligible,
provided foreigners remain confident that ourinfla-
tion will continue to be contained. Given this confi-
dence, foreign willingness to lend should not be a
serious constraint on the size offuture U.S. current
account deficits.
The risk most often associated with foreign len-
17
ding-transfer risk-is apt to be negligible for the
U.S. given the key international role of the dollar
andtheopennessofourfinancialmarkets to foreign
financial flows. Certainly,.sovereign risk qm also
be neglectedJor they.S. given itslongnistory of
politicalstability. Indeed, •.the U.S .• and the ••dollar
appear increasingly to be/regarded as safe-havens
forfunds from abroad. This implies that foreigners
would be willing•to.lend here • teflllsthatareat
least as favorable as those they would demand at
home.
Thissceriario leaves unanticipated inflation
the major potential risk faced by foreign (and do-
lllestic) lenders tathe· U.S. An unf6teseenand
prolonged surge in U.S. il1flationcould serious-
lyerode the purchasing power of fundslent (in
dollars) by foreigners. Ifconcerns were to arise that
U.S. inflation might be rekindled, foreign reluc-
tance to invest here could conceivably become a
serious obstacle to the financing of our external
deficits. However, another serious.roundofinflation
is only likely to occurifthere is a substantial shift in
monetary policy away from its present anti-infla-
tionary stance. In effect, then, country risk is apt to
remain neglible for the U.S. as long as ourgovern-
ment maintains the credibility of its anti-inflation
commitment. 21
How large? Assuming, then, thatforeigners\\iill
finance an ongoing U.S. currentaccountcteficit,
how large could it be? The answer clearly depends
on the size of the ongoing public sectordeficit,as
well as on how private domesticsavinganQinvest-
ment are affected (See Box 2 forfurther details).
Current projections suggest that the combined defi-
cit of federal, state, and localgovernlllents will
average 3.0-3.5 percent of GNP in coming years
under present policies. 22 It is also reasonable to
expect the net private saving rate toremain at its
postwar average (about 7.3 percent.ofGNP) since
past U.S. experience suggests it is both stable and
not significantly affected by budget deficits. 23
Assessing our future investment rate is more diffi-
cult, since it will depend on how profit opportunities
here cOlupare with those abroad.. Given thatrecent
U.S. business.tax cuts have significantly raised the
after-tax return to business,the U.S.shareofworld
investment might conservatively be projected.to
remain (at least) at its past average. This would1819
imply (see box) a.net investIllent rate ofapproxi-
mately 6.0 percent ofourGNP.
Together, these (very)roughprojections implyan
ongoing U.S. current account deficit of 1.7__2.2
percentofGNP, representing ~55-70billion at1.984
pricesand GNP. Foreigners wouldthenbefipancing
over halfof our public sector deficit,.leavillg less
than half to be financed from domestic sources. Of
course, ifdomestic saving were to rise (as supply-
siders expect), the current ac<::ount deficit could be
significantly less. Alternatively, ifthe U.S.shareof
world investment were to rise, the deficit could be
much greater. Despite these uncertainties, this ex-
ercise does indicate that the persistence of budget
deficits at current rates almost certainly will lead to
unprecedentedly large ongoing U.S. current account
deficits. Still, as we now argue, such deficits,
shocking as they may seem, are not, o/themselves,
necessarily harmful to oureconomy.
Where's the Burden? Government budget deficits
are thought to impose burdens, oreconomic costs,
on the nation incurring them. Ofcourse, these costs
must be weighed against the benefits the policies
underlying the deficits may bring. In this sense, the
costs of budget deficits reflect the reallocation of
society's resources-from future to present expen-
diture and between public and private spending-
rather than any misallocation ofthose resources, or
burden to the nation as a whole (that is, present plus
future generations). Nonetheless, conventional
theory suggests that deficits will impose costs on
certain sectors and individuals-manifest in terms
ofhigher real interest rates,.Iower domestic invest-
ment, and lower private consumption for future
generations. 24
We have argued here that by borrowing from
abroad through current account deficits, the U.S.
may not ultimately suffer much increase in real
interest rates and may be able to maintain its past
investment levels. This does not mean that by bor-
rowing from abroad our nation can entirely escape
the budget deficit burden, however. By borrowing
from abroad the deficit's costs may be reduced
(compared to the cost ifwe could not borrow), but a
significant burden is likely to remain.
As noted earlier, the deficits have temporarily
raised real interest rates. Even ifthis increase is not
permanent, housing and other interest-rate-sensitivesectors of our economy certainly have suffered in
the interim. Furthermore, the high real value ofthe
dollar brought about by increased real interest rates
has sharply reduced the demand for the output of
ourtraded-goods sectors.
Admittedly, by borrowing from abroad over the
last several years, the U.S. has probably been able
to maintain real interest rates at a lower level than
would otherwise have been possible in the fa.ceof
the budget deficits. But this does not necessarily
mean that the burden has been avoided-onlythat it
has been shifted from interest-sensitive to tradeable
goods industries. That is, in order for the U.S. to
borrow from abroad (during the transition to the
long-term), our exports must shrink relative to our
imports, and this implies a reduction in the outputof
our tradeable goods industries. In effect, budget
deficits do "crowd-out" certain domestic industries,
even in an open economy-and tradeable· goods
industries may sufferas much ormore than illterest-
sensitive sectors.
Ultimately, the burden ofa budgetdeficit is apt to
be manifest in lower(private) consumption forfuture
generations. In a closed economy, this burden comes
about as the lower investment resulting from the
deficit reduces the future capital stock, and hence
future output available to meet the nation's needs.
An open economy like the U.S. may be able to
avoid this reduction in its capital stock, and long-
term output, by borrowing from abroad. However,
the U.S. must still pay foreigners a portion ofthat
output to service its external debt Ineffed, the
portion ofourcapital stock owned by U.S. citizens
can be expected to fall, even ifthe stock itselfdoes
not. Alternatively, the level of future U.S. output
may not be reduced much, but the income from that
output earned by our citizens almost certainlywill
be. In this sense, deficits do impose a long-term
burden, one that is qualitatively the same as would
occur in a closed economy.
Despite these burdens, there can be little doubt
that our nation does benefit by its ability to draw on
foreign funds to help finance ourbudgetdeficits. As
indicated earlier, our domestic real interest rates
almost certainly will ultimately be loweras aresult.
Furthermore, to the extent that foreign borrowing
allows the U.S. to maintain its investmentand fu-
ture output capacity, the productivity and wagesof
our workers will be higherthan they would be ifwe
could not borrow from abroad. In this sense, the
current account deficits resulting from U.S. budget
deficits are beneficial to our nation because. they
help to reduce, although not eliminate, the budget's
ultimate burden.
IV. Conclusion
Over the last several years, the U.S. has experi-
enced unprecedentedly high real interest rates, real
dollar values, budget deficits and current account
deficits. We have argued in this article that these
conditions are closely related and largely the result
ofthe increase in U.S. budget deficitsthatthreaten
to remain at extraordinarily high levels for· many
years.
Our budget deficits represent ademandforfunds
the government that must be metfrom an excess
ofdomestic savingoverinvestment, orby borrowing
from abroad, or both. In an open economy, an
increased budgetdeficit may be metpartiaIIythrough
an increase in borrowing frorn abroad; its counter-
part is an increase in the currenfaccountdeficit. In
contrast to the textbook closed economy case, the
channels transmitting the effects ofbudgetdeficits
to the open economy include exchange rates as well
20
as interest rates. This is particularly evidentduring
the transition period before the currentaccount has
fully adjusted to a budget deficit. Initially, an in-
creased budget deficit is likely to raise dornesticFe~1
interest rates which, in tum, raise the real e)(change
rate. The higher real exchange rate then indyces .•••~
current account deterioration thateffects thetransf~r
offoreign saving to help finance the bUdgetdefi~.it.
A.fter several years, however, when the current af-
count has fully adjusted to the bUdgetdeficiti~~\':'
the initial pressures on interesttatesa.re li~?l~ito
subside substantially, and real interestratesandthe
real dollar should then fall backtowardlowerJevels.
In a growing world economy, ongoingUS. cur-
rent account deficits can in. principle b~ financed
from foreign savings, and there is no/theoretical
reason and, in the absence of a shift in Federal
Reserve policy toward monetizing federal deficits,
/few practical reasons why the United States could
not borrow from foreigners for many years to come.
The U.S. current account may therefore remain in
substantial defiCit as long as budget deficits ofthe
present magnitlld", persist.
Ouranalysis has direct implications for policy-
makers concefued about ourgrowing trade defiCits.
First, attelTIPts to eliminate ourcurrentaccount and
trade deficits by imposing trade barriers (for exam-
ple, quotas, "voluntary" export agreements, tar-
iffs, legislation ofdomestic content ratios for im-
ports, and other measures), are likely to do more
harm than good to the economy. These measures
will raise costs to consumers and, by encouraging
an inefficient and distorted alloction of our re-
sources, may make U.S. industry less, not more,
competitive in international markets. In addition, to
the extent thattrade barriers are effective in redu-
Cing our current account deficits and, hence, in
reduCing foreign capital inflows, U.S. interest rates
are likely to be higher than would otherwise be the
case. This would both lower domestic private in-
vestment and raise the overall cost of our budget
defiCits.
Similarly, a more expansionary monetary policy
designed specifically to reduce real interest rates
and the value ofthe dollar in the foreign exchanges
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also would most likely prove counter-productive
over the. longer term. In particular, a more. expan-
sionaryU.S. monetary policyprobably would.cause
thedoUar to depreCiate and eventually narrow the
U.S. currentand trade account. deficits. Not.only
would this policy reversal undermine our hard~won
gairis againstinflation,·it could greatly undermine
foreigners' willingness to lend to the U.S., arid
hence reduce the extent to which we could finance
our budget deficits by borrowing from them. For
this reason, expansionary monetary policy could
ultimately lead to higher real interest rates and lower
domestic investment(greatercrowdingout) thanwe
would otherwise suffer.
Thus, our analysis implies that ifa reduction in
our current account and trade defiCits is deemed an
important policy objective, the most effective and
efficient measure for doing sO is through a major
reductioninthe U.S. federal budgetdeficit. Only in
this way will ourexternal deficits be reduced with-
out creating either serious distortions in ourliberal
trade environmentoraresl.ltgenceofU.S. inflation.
Conversely, in the absellceof a federal deficit re-
duction, the benefits derived from continued for-
eign savings inflows-the counterpart ofour large
current account deficits-are likely to outweigh
their costs.[i - (pe-p)]+ [se _(p*e_pe)J - [s- (p*-p)J
The left-hand expression and the first termonthe right are
simply the foreign and domestic real interest rates, respec-
tively; thesecond bracketed terms arethelogarithms ofthe
expected future and current real exchange rate. These
relations apply, in principle, to all maturities. For further
discussion, see Hutchison (1984).
7. Thisadjustmentprocess is termedexchangerate "over-
shooting". See Dornbusch (1976) for an original contribu-
tion on overshooting in a simple monetaryrnodel of ex-
change rate determinationwith sluggish priceadjustmentin
the goods market.
Note that the proportionality described in the text between
the exchange rate impactof an interestratechangeandthe
maturity is strictly valid only for pure discount instruments.
For coupon instruments, the impact is proportional to the
duration ratherthan.the nominal maturity.
8. See Michael Keran, "Budget Deficits and Foreign Sav-
ings," FRBSF Weekly Letter, July 6, 1984, for a discussion
ofthe recent U.S. experienceusingan analyticalframework
similarto that presented here.
9. The determinants of this lag can be fairly complex. The
lag could be very long if, for example, the policies under-
lying thebudgetdeficitweretoraise substantiallythe return
to domestic investment. As explained later in the text, this
could lead to an increase inthe domesticshareofthe world
capital stocktobring domesticand foreign returnstocapital
back toward equality. Such a process is apt to take many
yearstobecompleted, however. The lagcouldalso bevery
short, particularly if the policies generating the deficit di-
rectly and immediately alterexport and importdemands.
10. The size of a nation's external debt in relation to its
GNP, and the share offoreign wealth that debtrepresents,
can be related to the long-term current account/GNP ratio.
To illustrate, suppose that the domestic and foreign econ-
omies are growing at the same rate, "g" (allOWing these
rates to be different does not significantly alter the conclu-
sions). Then,
DIY = (CAIY)/g
where D/V is the long-term external debt (D) to GNP (V)
ratio and CAIY is the long-term current account deficit
(CA/GNP) ratio. This condition follows immediately from
the observation that a constant D/V over time implies that
the growth of external debt equals the growth rate of GNP.
Similarly, it is easy to showthat
C + I + G + (X-M) - R = C + S + T
i* = i + (se - s)
from which the relation (1) in the textfollows immediately.
3. Note again that our analysis assumes a floating ex-
change rate regime. The dynamic adjustment to a budget
deficit underfixed exchangerates is verydifferentfrorn that
traced in the text.
4. A large and growing literature exists on the relations
betweenbudgetdeficitsandreal interestrates andoutputin
closed economies. Somehave argued that deficits bearno
relation toreal interestrates ineithera settingwith lessthan
full employmentofresourcesorafull employmentsituation.
This view is often termed the Ricardian equivalence prop-
osition. Its central tenet is that the private sector is indif-
ferent between tax- and deficit-finance of government ex-
penditures, andthatinterestrates will notbeaffected bythe
division between the two forms of financing the government.
(See J. Bisignano, 1984 for a complete discussion of this
issue). The discussion in the text assumes the received
macroeconomic theory holds, however, and that govern-
mentbudget deficits are likely to exert upward pressure on
real interest rates when the economy is at full employment.
5. A "risk premium" or equilibrium real interest differential
also is included in this equation. We have subsumed this
premium within our "risk adjusted" real interest rate mea-
sure for simplicity ofexposition. See Hutchison (1984) fora
more detailed discussion ofrisk premium determinantsand
references to the literature on the subject.
6. Thetextrelation follows directlyfrom the paritycondition
for nominal interest rates,
FOOTNOTES
1. A recent empirical study by Laney (1984) finds onlyin a i* _(p*e -p*)
few cases a positive (statistically significant) link in the
postwar periodbetween theexternal balanceandthefiscal
balance for the major industrial economies. The empirical
investigation ofthestudyshowed a rnuchtighterlinkagefor
the smaller developing countries than for the industrial
countries, however, presumably.because of. the lack of
domestic capital markets and inelastic private domestic
savings in developing nations.
2. In national income accounting terms, the value of na-
tional output (V) equalsthe sumofprivate consumption (0)
and investment (I), government expenditures(G), and ex-
ports (X), less the amount spent on imports (M). National
income-which equalsthe value ofnational outputless net
transfers to abroad (R)-is divided intoprivate consumption
and savings (S), and taxes (T). Hence,
This says that the foreign nominal interest rate (i* - ex-
pressed as the percentageyield to maturity) mustequal the
dOrnestic nominal interest (1- for the sarne rnaturity and
expressed sirnilarly) plus theexpeCted apprecia.tion (toma-
turity) of the nominal exchange r;:lte (s- expressed asthe
logarithm of the foreign currency price of domestic cur-
rency). Defining the logarithm of the domestic and foreign
price levels as p and p* respectively, while 'e' refers to
expected future values,
D/W*=(CAIY)(VIY*) -7- (W*IYX)g
where D/W* is the long-term external debt/foreign wealth
(W*) ratio, VIY* is the ratio of hometo foreign income (V*),
and W*/v* is the foreign wealth/GNP ratio. Thus, fora given
constant curient account/GNP ratio, there is a consta.nt
debt/GNP and debt/foreign wealth ratio in the long-run
(admittedly, this conclusion is somewhataltered ifdomestic
and foreign growth rates differ). Conversely, the external
22debtlforeign wealth ratio can grow continually over time
only ifthe CAIYis also growing, that is, does not leveloff.
11. Turnovsky (1976) and Sachs andWyplosz (1984) ana-
lyze budget policies for open economies in a static context,
while.Hodrick (1980) considers their impact on growing
economies. Comparison of their results demonstrates
graphicallythatthe implicationof a given bUdget policycan
depend critically upon whetherthere is growth ornot. Con-
sider, for example, a policy that initially increases both
current government expenditure and the deficit, but leaves
taxes unchanged in both the short- and long-run. In a static
context, thegovernment'sbudget(and thecurrentaccount)
must ultimately balance. This implies that in the long-run,
the level of government expenditure mustactually fallfrom
its original level to allow the increased government interest
payments resulting from the initial deficit to be financed.
Whenthere is growth, expenditure need only fall backto its
original level, s.ince anongoing deficitto meettheincreased
interest payments is feasible. Thus, the nature of the gov-
ernment's budgetconstraint is radically differentin a growth
context from that applying in a static context. Forthis reason
alone (and there are others), the implications ofstatic mod-
els canbe very misleading for actual experience.
12.••The risk that a governmentwill preventitscitizensfrom
repayingforeign debts, eitherbydefaulting ordenyingthem
accesstoforeign currency, isalso known as "political" risk.
RiSks in lending to a country arising from unexpected ex-
change rate changes, which we include among ourmacro-
economic risks, arecommonly known as "exchange risks".
Note also that the risks associated with lending to a given
country are not always the same as those incurred by
lending in its currency. Sovereign risk generally does not
depend on the currency in which the loan is extended, while
transfer (and exchange) risk does.
13. Applying relation (1) to "long-term" real interest rates
(again expressed as percentage yield to maturity rather
than on an annualized basis),
where qr. is the expected "long-run" real exchange rate.
Suppose that there is no long-term seculartrend in domes-
tic relative to foreign prices and hence in the real exchange
rate. Then, since (bydefinition)the real exchange rate must
ultimately cOrne to equal its long-run value, the domestic
long-term real interest rate must settle to a level equal to
that of its foreign counterpart. (At this point,. short- and
long-term realinterest rates are equalized internationally).
MOre generally, the domestic real interestrate must ulti-
mately equal the foreign.real rate. plus the long-term, or
secular, rate ofchange of the real exchange rate. In either
case,.it is evident that the equalization of domestic and
foreign real·· interest rates-as conventionally defined in
terms of domestic and foreign price indices=is notdepen-
ctentuponttlespeedofarbitrage infinancial markets,buton
theadjustmentofpricesingoods marketstotheirlong-term
values, a process which can take many years (see, for
example, the discussion in Niehans, 1984, Chapter6).
14. The fact that the long-term real exchange rate impact
of budget policies depends on how they affect (excess)
demand forforeignvensus domestic gOQdS isdiscussed in
detail in Sachs and Wyplosz (1984). See also Blanchard
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and Dornbusch (1984). Hodrick's (1980) growth model of
budget policies assumes foreign and domestic economies
produce a single identical good and so does not consider
real exchange rate impacts.
15. Forexample, a recent study by Robert Feldman (1982)
suggeststhatthe nearly 30 percent real appreciation ofthe
dollar over 1980-1983 reduced the U.S. trade balance by
as much as $60 billion. See also Peter Hooper and Ralph
Tryon (1984).
16. See, for example, a recent study by Peter Hooper
(1983). See also Fielke (1984).
17. For a survey of this literature, see the recent U.S.
Treasury study, The Effect of Deficits on the Prices of
Financial Assets: Theory and EVidence (1984). This study
concludesthatthere is noempiricalsupportforasystematic
real interest rate-budget deficit link for the United States.
Otherresearchers, however, dopresent evidenceofasys-
tematic linkage. (See Sinai and Rathjens, 1983 and Fried-
man, 1982.) In addition, Hutchison and Pyle, in an accom-
panying article in this ReView, find support for this linkage
by looking at international evidence.
18. This view has been expressed in a recent article by
ArthurLafferin the Los Angeles Times, (January24, 1984).
19. As this argument suggests, changes in fiscal policies
can have implications for interest rates, exchange rates,
and the current account very similar to those discussed in
the text, even if they do notlead to a budget deficit. The
converse is that our real interest rates and the dollar could
remain high even if our budget deficit were eliminated,
provided that fiscal policy continued to encourage invest-
mentin the U.S. (forexample, ifthe deficitwere reduced by
raising taxes on consumption). Note also thatto the extent
that investment incentives are responsible for recent de-
velopments, the "adjustment" period required to bring our
interest rates back to world levels may be very long, perhaps
considerably longerthan ifbudgetdeficitsthemselveswere
the main cause. The reason is that changes in the after-tax
yield to investment relative to abroad will ultimately haveto
be offset by a "redistribution" of the world capital stock
toward the U.S. (to the point where the marginal revenue-
product of capital falls enough to offset our more favorable
taxtreatment). This process could take manyyears.
20. Our current account's deficit's (CA) share of foreign
saving (S') can be written as:
CA/S' = (CAIY)(Y/Y') -i- (S'/Y')
where YIY' is the U.SJforeignGNP ratio, which isroughly
55 percent, while S'/Y' is the foreign industrial country
(net) saving rate, whose average is about 11 percent.
These figures were derived from the OECD National Ac-
counts: Main Aggregates, 1953-1982. They represent
averagesfor 1979-1981.
In long-term "steady state", the current accountdeficit
will largely, if not entirely, consist of interest payments.to
abroad while the budget deficitconsists ofinterestpayments
on the national debt. More precisely, ifthe long-term (U.S.)
real interest and growth rates were the same, then the
long-term current account deficit would exactly equal the
net interest payments of the U.S. on its foreign debt,while
the budget deficit equaled the interest payments On thenational debt. Thus, when theinterestand growthrates are
the same, net exports of goods and services (that is, the
portion of the current account excluding net interestpay-
ments to abroad) must be in balance,. while. government
expenditures net of interest payments must equal govern-
ment revenues. When the interest rate exceeds thegrowth
rate, the current account and budgetdeficits are ultimately
less than the respective interest payrnents. Government
revenues must then exceed non-interest expenditures and
net exports of goods and services must be in surplus inthe
steady state. In general, then, a permanent deficit in the
non-interest portion of the budget is not possible.in the
long-run, at least not without some financing from money
creation, unless the interest rate is below the growth rate.
This has been pointed out by T Sargent and N. Wallace,
"Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Federal Bankof
Minneapolis Quarterly Review. Fall, 1981, p. 1-17. Con-
versely, when the interest rate is below the growth rate, the
current account deficit exceeds foreign interest payments,
allowing the borrowerto maintan along-term trade deficit.
21. In making this argument, we are relying as much,or
more, on theoretical plausibility as actual evidence. There
remains considerable controversy about the degree of in-
ternational capital mobility. While several studies suggest
there are country/currency risk premiums in short-term
interest rates for the major industrial nations (Meese and
Singleton, 1980 and Hodrick and Hansen, 1980), there is
very little evidence to suggest they are very large, or sys-
tematically related to a nation's external debt (Frankel,
1982; Blanchard and Dornbush, 1984).
Several other studies have found that current accountdefi-
cits have not historically contributed much to domestic in-
vestment (Feldstein and Horoika, 1980 and Dooley and
Pennati, 1984). This finding is consistent with the hypo-
thesis that international capital mobility is very low, but this
pattern can also be explained in terms of other factors.
Furthermore, there issomeevidencethat internationalcap-
ital mobility has increased over the last decade; if so rela·
tions among current account deficits and investment may
have changed.
22. See McElhattan, 1984, as well as the references cited
there.
23. See David and Scadding, 1974.
24. In effect, fiscal policies represent choices in the way
society's resources, present and future, will be allocated.
Deficits can be viewed as one among many types of"tax
policies" available to finance a given level ofexpenditure,
present and future. They, in effect, represent taxes on future,
rather than present, generations. Thus, deficits themselves
have no clear-cut welfare implications. Furthermore, the
"costs" of deficits will generally be borne partly by those
abroad (when the nation incurring the deficit can borrow
from abroad). Again, as with any tax policy in an open
economy, a portion ofthe burden may be "exported."
25. Recent work that suggests long-term interest rates
differ from the average of future shOrt-term rates (withouta
risk premium) has cast doubt on the simple rationalexpec-
tations model of the term structure. Campbell and Shiller
(1983) modify the "simple" expectations theory to include
time-varying risk premia, however, and appear better able
to reconcile actual movements in long-term and short·term
interest rates with the methodology. Nevertheless, under
our assumed condition of perfect foresight (that is, noun-
certainty), the simple expectations theory would hold as an
arbitrage condition.
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